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ABSTRACT 
The paper provides a quantitative analysis of the armed confrontation 
that took place in Greece between the Communist Party and the Centre-
Right Government during 1946-1949. Using monthly data for battle 
casualties a dynamic Lotka-Volterra framework is estimated, pointing to 
the existence of a conflict trap that explains the prolongation of the civil 
war and its dire consequences for the country. To examine the extent to 
which the confrontation was influenced by socio-economic factors, a 
regional analysis finds that political discontent was mainly correlated 
with pre-war grievances rather than class-structure, while the 
mobilization of guerilla forces was crucially affected by morphology and 
the local persecutions by the Government. The economic cost of the 
conflict is estimated to be close to an annual GDP, and its effect to last 
for at least a decade, in line with similar findings in contemporary civil 
wars. The failure to prevent the conflict or stop its escalation is discussed 
together with some conclusions for the long term repercussions and the 
current social discontent in Greece. 
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The Conflict Trap in the Greek Civil War 
1946-1949: 
An economic approach 
 
1. Introduction 
The Greek Civil War (GCW) that took place in 1946-1949 between the 
Communist Party (KKE) and a coalition Government of centre and 
rightwing parties had lasting and dramatic consequences for the country 
in general and the economy in particular. The human carnage exceeded 
the number of battle-deaths during the Italian and German invasions in 
1940-41, and was followed by massive expatriation of defeated guerillas 
and their families. Persecutions and political segregation lasted for a 
quarter century, making Greece a hotbed of authoritarianism that 
culminated in a brutal dictatorship before a liberal democracy was finally 
restored in 1974.  
Amid many questions that are still pending on why and how the civil war 
erupted, there is a central paradox regarding the intensity and 
perseverance of the conflict. Ex post, it seems obvious that a termination 
of hostilities could have been proven beneficial for both sides, especially 
if one takes into account that the country had just exited another 
catastrophic war and prospects were naturally being expected to 
improve and provide more opportunities for all. But instead of opting for 
a constitutional power sharing as happened under similar 
confrontational circumstances in Belgium in 1944 and in Italy in 1946, 
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the adversaries in Greece got engaged in a prolonged conflict with 
enormous consequences in human, economic and political terms. 
In the first place, the Greek National Army (GNA) seemed to be vastly 
superior in size and equipment and this was making it to be unwinnable 
by the guerillas. But this was not necessarily translated to a clear 
advantage in the mountainous battlefields where the fighters of the 
Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) proved to be undefeatable. Thus, a 
‘conflict trap’ emerged, whereby the effort of one side to win was 
matched by the opponent’s response which, nevertheless, was not 
sufficient to redraw the balance and led to the perpetuation of 
hostilities. It was this combination of GNA unwinnability and DAG 
undefeatedness that made the conflict and its costs to escalate beyond 
any imaginable level and handicapped the prospects of the country for 
more than a generation. 
Though there are plenty of contributions on the political and ideological 
issues pertaining GCW as well as vast anecdotal evidence on 
battleground episodes, a systematic analysis of the socioeconomic 
causes and consequences of the conflict trap is still lacking. One reason 
is certainly political: for nearly three decades the only available view was 
that of the winners, until it was reversed by the wave of left-wing 
interpretations that prevailed after 1974. It was only during the last two 
decades that key historical episodes have been scrutinized and a more 
balanced approach was adopted; see, for example, the collections by 
Baerentzen et al (1987), Iatrides and Wrigley (1995), Koutsoukis and 
Sakkas (1996), Nikolakopoulos et al (2002), among many others.  
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Another reason was the inadequacy of existing data series on 
socioeconomic and military developments, due both to the official 
secrecy surrounding the conduct of the war as well as the fateful 
decision of the Greek Government in 1989 to massively destroy 
historical archives related to the Civil War1. Some quantitative evidence 
on GCW can be found in Margaritis (2000) where military and economic 
aspects of the conflict are described though not in a formal framework, 
while Marantzidis (2010) provides extensive information on the logistics 
of the guerilla army. A path-breaking exception was the field research 
conducted by Kalyvas (2006) that led to the reconstruction of conflict 
data series and enabled a formal analysis on the origins and mechanisms 
of violence in GCW. This, however, covers only one prefecture of Greece 
thus aggregate or regional-wide comparisons cannot be undertaken.  
The scarcity of quantitative analysis is even more pronounced if one 
takes into account the prolific literature on the dynamics and the 
economic aspects of civil wars worldwide, the research on which 
includes both theoretical advances on conflict modeling as well as a rich 
methodology for assessing their consequences, as is briefly reviewed in 
the next Section. Motivated by these findings – and challenges – of 
contemporary literature, the present paper aims to explore the 
following issues pertaining to the Greek Civil War: 
First, it aims to estimate the dynamics of GCW and investigate the 
existence and stability of a conflict trap. A statistical analysis of battle 
data series shows that the conflict should be examined into two phases; 
one with relatively low-scale operations spanning the period 1946-1947 
                                                 
1
 The Herostratian decision was taken on the naïve expectation that national reconciliation is achieved 
not by studying and understanding history but by eliminating its records.  
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and the other with major-scale conflicts that took place in 1948-49. A 
modified version of the dynamic Lotka-Voltera model is estimated for 
each period, and stable non-trivial equilibria are numerically calculated 
and compared with actual developments in the battle-field. Moreover, 
the regional aspects of the conflict are examined to see how they were 
influenced by geographical morphology and local grievances, old and 
current. 
Second, it aims to assess the costs incurred in the Greek economy as a 
result of the vast destruction of human and material resources during 
the conflict and compare it with other findings in modern civil wars.  One 
method is by estimating potential GDP of Greece in the absence of GCW 
and then juxtaposing it with actual output to obtain a measure of output 
foregone. Alternatively, by employing neoclassical growth accounting 
one can measure the destruction on labor, industries and the livestock, 
and obtain an estimate of the fall on economic activity due to the 
conflict. Results by the two methods are then compared with similar 
estimates on other civil wars. 
Third, to discuss the perpetuation of conflict as a political and 
institutional failure due to the confusion of tactics and the lack of 
institutional credibility on power-sharing as suggested by modern game-
theoretic advances on the analysis of prolonged confrontations.  
The above objectives demand coherent data series and, to overcome 
their inadequacy or unavailability, I decided to “dig in the sources of 
events’. New data series on battle casualties and persecutions covering 
the whole period 1946-1949 at a monthly frequency were compiled by 
systematically recording detailed – though usually scattered - evidence 
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that can be found in Greek military reviews, US military archives and 
various reports recently published by KKE. As no official census took 
place in the 1940s, several socioeconomic indices were proxied by 
regional data retrieved from the Statistical Surveys conducted in the 
nearest possible occasion either in the late 1930s or in 1951.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews 
the conflict literature, Section 3 provides a statistical analysis of the 
Greek battle data, and Section 4 presents an econometric estimation of 
the conflict traps. Section 5 describes the regional aspects of the conflict 
and Section 6 assesses the economic cost incurred to Greece by 
employing econometric or production function techniques. Section 7 
attempts to explain the prolongation of the conflict in terms of policy 
failures and, finally, Section 8 draws some conclusions and lessons that 
might be relevant to the current political situation in Greece. The paper 
has three supplements: Appendix A describes the theoretical properties 
of the conflict model; Appendix B includes the estimates of the 
economic cost, while in Appendix C the data series are defined and 
sourced. 
2.  A brief review of the literature 
The state of the art on analyzing civil conflicts is emphasized from 
different perspectives by several authors: Regarding the causes of civil 
wars, the theories of grievances and rational greed are examined here as 
alternative explanations. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001), an 
individual participates in an insurgence if expected gains outweigh the 
costs of engagement plus benefits foregone by abandoning current 
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activities. Grievances thrive with poverty and political exclusion but 
remain short of spurring a civil war, unless the opportunity cost of 
rebellion is reduced due to weak enforcement institutions and 
ineffective repression.  In the same line, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue 
that violence is escalated when repression is poorly enforced, thus 
reducing costs and increasing expected payoffs for insurgents. The greed 
theory however may be at odds in explaining costly conflicts that 
seriously damage both adversaries irrespective of the outcome, as 
proved to be the case of GCW.  
In an authoritative review, Sambanis (2002) criticizes the opportunity-
cost model by arguing that the escalation of repression leads to larger-
scale hostilities rather than suppressing them. Instead, democratic 
institutions may prove efficient in alleviating grievances and thus 
prevent bloodletting. Similarly, Blattman and Miguel (2009) inquire 
various root-causes theories and conclude that slow economic growth 
and favorable geographic conditions are found to be robustly linked to 
civil wars. Grievance theory is not new and in fact has been adopted by 
several rebel leaders2 in their advocacy of conflict when all other means 
have failed (or claimed to be so).  
As noted by Lu and Thies (2011), grievance precedes opportunity and 
denotes just a motivation to rebel that may be activated only if the 
opportunity cost to fight becomes very low whenever economic 
conditions deteriorate or exclusion politics dominate. Also Bruckner and 
Ciccone (2007) find that low income growth increases the likelihood of a 
                                                 
2 In the same line, Lenin (1929, p289) asserted that ‘the oppressed masses never won in a struggle 
involving losses of life, unless they were previously put in a state of despair due to long lasting 
hardships and acute crises’, though not for alleviating but rather seeking such a terminal situation.  
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civil war in autocratic regimes, though democracies are more likely to 
undertake pre-emptive action and attenuate the threat. As pointed by 
Regan and Norton (2005), grievance is not automatically transformed 
into rebellion unless party elites are capable of collective mobilization 
and of ensuring protection for those participating. Besley and Persson 
(2008) have shown that more consensual political institutions reduce the 
incidence of conflict as distribution of more public goods shrinks the 
value of unilateral appropriation by the party in power.  
Regarding the economic legacy of the civil conflict, neoclassical growth 
theory is usually employed to identify how the destruction of factors of 
production affects growth. The growth-inflicting list may also include the 
disruption of markets, curtailment of trade and foreign investment, and 
the deterioration of productive infrastructure caused either by 
destruction or under-financing as Government resources increasingly go 
for military procurement; see for example Murdoch and Sandler (2004). 
On the same topic, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) estimated that a civil war 
incurs a loss totaling between 90% and 105% of a year’s GDP. 
Another strand of literature attributes the occurrence and duration of 
civil wars to incomplete and asymmetric information that distorts the 
payoffs expected to be won by the adversaries; In a recent contribution 
Acemoglou and Wolitzky (2013) argue that incomplete information 
about rival’s intentions may lead one side to interpret noisy signals as 
pretentious tactics of the other in order to gain advantage and opts to 
respond in a similar manner. The outcome is that each side maximizes its 
own aggression leading to ‘conflict spirals’.   
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Another cause of prolonged conflicts is the failure to negotiate 
effectively, either because there is uncertainty about ulterior motives or 
simply because agreements lack an enforcement technology. In 
Cunningham (2013) negotiations by proxy may fail because “in many 
cases mediators and others may have interests beyond just ending the 
fighting” and it may the case that “international actors are unwilling to 
intervene to the degree necessary to forcibly disarm veto players”. 
Uncertainties multiply in the absence of an undisputable leader, and it is 
well-known that the closer the electoral scores of the partners of a 
coalition, the more competitive they are with each other; for an analysis 
see Tsebelis (1998). Skarpedas (2008) argues that the ability to enforce 
negotiated contracts between competing groups is weakened by various 
factors ranging from geography and ethnicity to external intervention, 
and this makes the option of war to look more appealing for 
appropriating power, even when the cost of engagement is multiplied.  
But even when leaderships truly seek a compromise, their efforts may 
be impeded by the accumulation of aggression exercised at a 
decentralized level. As analyzed by Kalyvas (2006, Ch. 9), the spreading 
of violence at a micro-level before and during the GCW proved to be a 
powerful fertilizer of the conflict as hardliners of both sides had all the 
excuses to interpret these actions as signals of mounting aggression by 
their opponent.  
Regarding the modeling of conflict situations a large variety of 
approaches can be adopted. A comprehensive review of conflict 
modelling is given by Lichbach (1992) who groups more than two 
hundred scholarly contributions into two broad categories: those of the 
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rational choice optimizing framework, and the non-rational choice 
stochastic models. The first set is employed by the root-causes literature 
by testing – usually by cross country or regional panel data - the intensity 
of conflict against various explanatory variables. The second set studies 
the interaction dynamics by employing variants of Lotka-Volterra models 
that were originally devised to study species interactions. Such models 
were employed for studying the interactions generated by the class-
struggle (e.g. Goodwin, 1967), the arms race (e.g. Richardson, 1960), 
political rivalry (e.g. Fransisco, 1996), riots (e.g. Burbeck et al, 1978) or 
outright revolution (e.g. Tsebelis and  Sprague, 1989).  
An extreme case of stochastic modelling is the literature on power-law 
distributions of conflict casualties; Clauset et al (2007) use a cross 
section of fatality data to show that they follow a Paretian distribution, 
while Bohorquez et al (2009) relates such distributions with other 
confrontational phenomena from ecology to finance and social 
dynamics. Though carefully warning that “common statistical 
distributions … in sociological data is not the same as understanding 
their origin”, the authors nevertheless claim that their finding 
“establishes a quantitative connection between human insurgency, 
global terrorism and ecology, (my emphasis)”, and even point to the 
similarity to financial market models. As noted by Lichbach (1992) this 
atheoretical approach amounts to claiming that conflicts occur 
randomly, in sharp contrast with the schools of thought that interpret 
them as outcomes of rational calculation or a response to grievances. If 
anything, such contrast underlines not just the vast possibilities open to 
the researcher but also the huge gap that still divides alternative 
approaches to analyzing and quantifying civil wars. 
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3. Conflict data and periodicity 
The main developments in the Greek Civil War are described by 
examining monthly time series of battle-deaths and total battle-
casualties3 of both DAG and GNA during the period from January 1946 
until December 1949 as shown in Fig. 1. Although the formal beginning 
of the GCW is in dispute, it is clear that casualties are small during the 
first half of 1946. For the present purposes the start of the civil war is 
considered to be the July 1946 when confrontation tactics were 
simultaneously adopted by the Government and the Communist Party. 
In response to widespread persecutions by rightwing militias, the latter 
had already started to organize ‘self-defense’ groups throughout 
Greece4, and this prompted the former to set up emergency martial 
courts in several cities5 to prosecute acts against “public order and 
safety”. The formation of “Democratic Army of Greece” was formally 
announced in October 1946 and the conflict was ready to set off. 
3.1  Statistical analysis 
Main statistics are summarized in Table 1. The series of battle deaths 
and casualties are found to be non-stationary as the hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected for either series, reflecting the escalation of 
conflict. Losses rise sharply in the beginning of 1947 when DAG forces 
                                                 
3 Battle deaths and casualties include all people, combatant and civilian, that are killed or injured in 
armed engagements. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2007) this measure is more suitable to assess 
the human cost of a military confrontations. 
4 The decision was taken in June 1945, by the 12th Plenary; see Rizospastis (2011, p149). 
5 The Third Decree was issued in July 1946 and initially established 11 martial courts, but later they 
rose to 30. 
  11 
attack several towns6 and GNA launches the first wave of military 
operations7 to clear their holdings in the mountains. 
Fig.1 Total casualties (rhs) and battle deaths (lhs), monthly data 
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0
1000
2000
3000
4000
0
4000
8000
12000
16000
20000
24000
46:01 46:07 47:01 47:07 48:01 48:07 49:01 49:07
Jul46 Aug49
 
Note: The beginning of Civil War is marked on July 1946 and its end on August 1949.  
The shaded area in the first quarter of 1948 marks a structural break into two phases. 
Source: Data as in Appendix C. 
By the end of 1947, the conflict intensifies and acquires new operational 
and political characteristics. Employing a simple time-trend to remove 
non-stationarity, a structural break is detected at the beginning of 19488 
and this leads to a sub-periodicity into two phases, the first spanning 
from July 1946 to December 1947 and the second from January 1948 to 
September 1949 when hostilities formally ended.  
                                                 
6 The most spectacular attack took place in Sparta where 176 political prisoners were set free (2/48) 
and Florina which was held under full DAG control for several hours (5/48); see Marantzidis (2010, p 
192). 
7 The main operations were ‘Falcon-Ierax’ and ‘Stork-Pelargos’ (4/47),  ‘Eagle-Aetos’ (5/47), ‘Swan-
Kyknos’ (6/47) and ‘Crow-Korax’ (5-8/47). Casualties are given by GES (1976) and GES (1980) as 
described in Appendix C. 
8 The hypothesis of no breakpoint between January and March 1948 is rejected at a range of levels 
from 1% to 10% for total casualties and battle-deaths as shown in Table 1. 
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Comparing the statistics of the two phases a crucial change concerning 
the extent and nature of the conflict is revealed: The monthly average of 
battle-deaths quadruplets, while that of total casualties rises more than 
eightfold.  The standard deviation as a ratio to the mean drops in Phase 
II to less than half the measure of Phase I, suggesting that the conflict is 
concentrated on larger-scale confrontations rather than the earlier 
pattern of widespread skirmishes.   
Finally, the data are tested for the presence of power-law distributions. 
The complementary cumulative distribution function9 (ccdf) is defined as 
the probability of a random variable (X) exceeding a level of total 
casualties (x), and for a Pareto distribution is given as: 
       (1) 
where (λ) is the conflict index and (b) a lower bound, i.e. prob(X>)=1. The 
higher the index the less likely a number of casualties will occur, 
implying repetitive patterns of conflict at a more or less stable scale. As 
shown in Table 1, the estimated index is found to be substantially lower 
than the 2.50 value predicted by the statistical models in Clauset et al 
(2007). A possible interpretation for the low value of (λ) in Phase I is the 
quick escalation of the conflict, implying from (1) that larger-scale events 
are more likely. In Phase II, the index is 1.55 for battle-deaths and 1.60 
for total casualties, close to the estimates of 1.70 found by Bohorquez et 
al (2009) for the US and the Spanish civil wars. In any case, estimates are 
found to be sensitive to the sample selection, probably due to few 
observations available. 
                                                 
9 This is frequently called the ‘survivor’ function, but this is clearly unsuitable for battle deaths 
distributions. 
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3.2 Restructuring the GNA 
The conflict escalation in the beginning of 1948 was preceded by 
extensive enlargement and operationalization of both armies as shown 
in Fig. 2. But though steadily increasing from 92,000 in the beginning of 
1947 to 120,000 men by the end of the year, the Government army 
proved incapable to contain guerilla forces. Numerical supremacy of 
GNA was diminished in practice as many of its forces were allocated in 
non-combatant duties, while others were untrained and/or inadequately 
equipped for mountainous terrain; see Marantzidis (2010, p 92) and 
Averof (2010, p208). Gregoriadis (2011, p166) notes that the increase 
was a “nervous acceleration with the aim to be sent to the front the 
soonest possible”. It was only after 1947 that these drawbacks were 
faced by acquiring modern arms and training by the US mission in 
Greece after the adoption of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ against the 
expansion of Soviet influence. 
Fig.2  The size of the armies, January 1947-December 1949  
  
 
 Source: Data as in Appendix C. 
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GNA was further enlarged to 132,000, supplied by vast military 
shipments from the US (see Fig. 3), while combat training became more 
demanding, the army and non-combatant duties were delegated to the 
National Guard Battalions. At the same time, political cleansing 
intensified with left-leaning soldiers massively encamped in isolated 
islands10, while hundreds of officers were court-martialed for alleged 
communist infiltration. Finally, a high US command arrived in Athens in 
February 1948 to coordinate army operations and this marked a radically 
new course in the civil war, both operationally and regarding the 
geopolitical repercussions on the ensuing Cold War. 
Fig.3 The costs of military aid delivered to Greece for the GNA 
 
 
 
Source: JUSMAGG 1949, Diagram Funds and Costs, Greek Military Aid Program, 
Gound and Air.  
 
                                                 
10 The most notorious was the camp of Macronisos where 28,800 soldiers and officers had been kept 
between 1947-1950. Though the Government hailed the camp as a ‘moral transformation’ institution, 
several of them perished as a result of torture and starvation; for a discussion see Kaltsogia-Tournaviti 
(2001, p 72).. 
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3.3 The Formation of DAG 
Following a parallel – though more restrictive – process, DAG was trying 
to expand its force and improve logistics.  Apart from training and 
backyard facilities offered by the neighboring Balkan states, substantial 
military equipment was shipped from Poland and other Eastern 
European countries to DAG in 1948-1949 in an effort to counter the 
improved capabilities of GNA; details are given in Marantzidis (2010, p 
48-49). At the same time DAG was extensively restructured to cover all 
mainland and the islands11 so that the conflict is spread all over the 
country. The monthly development of the guerilla army (DAG) is 
estimated as a function of battle deaths (RKLD) and net recruitments 
(NET) as follows: 
(2) 
 
1947:02-1949:10, nobs=33, R2bar=0.419, DW=1.91, F-stat=8.70(p=0.0003) 
The coefficient of nearly 3 on battle-deaths suggests that, besides those 
killed in the field, twice as many were also stepping aside after the fight. 
Given that the number of wounded was in average three times that of 
battle deaths, this implies that two out of three wounded  were 
subsequently incapacitated of fighting; a high proportion confirming the 
claim that chronic shortages of medical facilities was one of the severest 
problems faced by DAG; see Rizospastis (2011, p302).  
                                                 
11 Details of the new structure in DAG are given by Kyritsis (2006, p 28). 
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New recruitments (NET) consist of voluntary or coerced participation or 
forcible of populations in the occupied areas (RECR), net of those 
captured (RCAPT) by, or surrendered (RSURR) to, GNA. The coefficient 
suggests that about two thirds were found suitable and the rest were 
either dismissed or, given the opportunity, deserting the front. Deserting 
was a two-way process. DAG seemed to be enlarged by GNA soldiers 
who were either captured in the field or fled the state army to join the 
guerillas. Numbers were probably underreported as missing in action 
(SMIA), though the estimated coefficient of more than 7 may be in 
excess of actual events.  
From the above equation it is noticeable that on top of the above 
process around 1,339 in average were further recruited every month. 
3.4 Political Developments 
As armies were enlarged, military and political strategies became more 
ambitious for both the Government and the communists. The latter 
formed a ‘Provisional Government’ in December 1947 and launched 
their first tactical warfare operation to proclaim Konitsa –a town near 
the northern borders - as the capital of ‘liberated’ territories. After two 
weeks of intense fighting the operation was thwarted and the strategy 
of DAG was subsequently adjusted by concentrating on the war in the 
countryside12. 
Days after the battle was concluded, the Communist Party as well as all 
fellow organizations were outlawed and a massive purge of militants 
                                                 
12 Rizospastis (2011, p 290). The was the first open disagreement about strategy between the DAG 
leader supporting the partisan fighting and the Secretary General of KKE who insisted on the urban 
struggle. 
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swept the country.13 Emergency martial courts were established in 
several more cities and procedures became swifter and stiffer; as a 
result prosecutions doubled in 1948 and death penalties increased 
threefold; see Fig. 4.  
Fig. 4 Total prosecutions and death penalties in the emergency martial 
courts 
 
 
Source: Michiotis 2007, Tables 1 and 2, pp 235-236. 
As the size of DAG continued to rise, more than 350,000 villagers were 
displaced from their land during 1948 and 1949 and transferred in 
refugee camps around the cities in Northern Greece. The Government 
presented the operation as protecting “bandit-stricken” villagers from 
being plundered, though KKE claimed14 that it was a ‘scorched earth’ 
policy aiming “… to undercut the provisioning system, the recruiting 
reserves and the intelligence system of DAG”; for a detailed account see 
Laiou (1987, p 61). Averof (2010, p 237) argues that in the beginning 
                                                 
13 For a description see Rizospastis (2011, p 292).  
14
  Rizospastis (2011, p 457). 
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villagers were voluntarily fleeing their homes to escape terror and the 
Government organized the operation to cut supply line only after 1948. 
Whatever the motivation, displacements hit DAG recruitments severely 
and this may be one of the reasons that its forces could not increase any 
further after 1948; Fig. 5 displays a strong negative correlation between 
displacements and increases in the DAG forces. 
Fig.5 Monthly changes in the DAG force and aggregate displaments 
lagged one period 
 
 
 Source: Data as  in Appendix C 
These developments undermined the chances of a negotiated end to the 
conflict, and further fuelled hostilities. For example, the evacuees 
developed a strong opposition against DAG for being the reason they 
were taken away from their land and several of them volunteered to 
fight against guerillas. On the other hand, the wave of prosecutions 
created a potential pool for new recruits for DAG as would-be suspects 
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opted to flee to the mountains and thus avoid being court-martialed. In 
the beginning of 1948, it was clear that both the Government and the 
guerillas were opting for a prolonged and bloodthirsty confrontation as 
analyzed in the next Section.  
4. Modeling the conflict trap 
The dynamics of conflict between the army of rebels and the state army 
are expressed by the following difference equations: 
      (3a) 
      (3b) 
Variables and  denote battle-casualties occurring at time (t) in the 
armies of rebels and state respectively, while Δ is first-differencing. 
Parameters represent the operational characteristics of the conflict. If 
assumed positive, parameters (α,γ) express the  “self-protection” rates 
as each army learns over time how to survive and reduce fatalities by 
better training and defense-building. The “striking capability” of each 
side is assumed to be proportional to its own casualties suffered in the 
battle scaled by the parameters (β, δ). Finally, (θ, φ) represent 
exogenous fatality shocks for the state and rebels’ armies respectively. 
The above model differs from other Lotka-Volterra formulations of 
conflict in three important aspects: 
First, it allows for contemporaneous interactions between the two 
armies as happens in the actual battle process rather than making the 
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unrealistic assumption that an army’s current casualties are determined 
by the opponent’s losses in the past.   
Second, it allows for exogenous disturbances to influence the path of 
events and – if permanent – the size and nature of the steady-state. 
Some models (e.g. Francisco, 2009) unrealistically assume that a 
prolonged conflict has only autonomous dynamics and remains immune 
from the external environment. This may be happen in biological 
experiments in vitro, but hardly is a case for actual wars. Exogenous 
shocks in the number of casualties may stem, if positive, from superior 
new technology acquired by its opponent or, if negative, from an 
improvement in its own survivability. The autonomous conflict is 
obtained as a special case by letting θ=φ=0. 
The third point is technical, but with crucial implications for the 
existence of non-trivial conflict equilibria. In both the standard discrete-
time framework with lagged interactions or the continuous-time system 
with current time terms, a limit cycle is obtained only if parameters (α,γ) 
are of opposite sign, a situation that as noted by Zhang et al (2007) 
corresponds to predator-prey populations.  But to assume that guerillas 
(or the state) are prepared to act as preys and still enter in a civil war is 
outright irrational, and – in fact - it is more likely that a conflict turns to 
be prolonged if the two sides adopt similar rather than diverging fighting 
patterns15. This asks for both parameters being negative and leads to a 
competitive behavior that is more suitable for modeling organized civil 
                                                 
15
 Pointedly, Clausewitz’s (1976, p480) advise was that a guerilla war should not be conceived as an 
isolated process but ‘in the framework of a war conducted by the regular army’. 
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strife16.  The solution of the model is described in Appendix A along with 
parameter conditions for the existence of non-zero equilibrium. 
4.1 Estimation 
The model (3a, 3b) is separately estimated for the two phases of civil 
war outlined in Section 3: the first covering the period from when the 
civil conflict started in July 1946 to December 1947 and the second from 
January 1948 to September 1949 when concluded with the defeat of 
DAG. Estimations for battle-deaths17 are displayed in Table 2 and all 
coefficients found to be statistically significant and correctly signed. 
The main conclusions per phase of conflict are the following: 
 (i). Survivability parameters (α,γ) are found to be nearly equal for both 
armies in Phase I. As losses for GNA include Gendarmerie and poorly-
trained local militias, results suggest that vulnerability of state troops 
was not any better than that of the insurgents. The balance shifts only in 
Phase II, during which self-protection hardly improves for DAG but rises 
by 47% for GNA due to the increasing professionalization of the state 
army and the fact that all other forces were placed under its operational 
command. 
(ii). The striking capabilities decline in Phase II as both armies get better 
organized and conflicts now involve larger-scale battles rather than 
skirmishes. Crucially, GNA capability (β) remains superior to that of DAG 
(δ) in both phases of the war. Fatality parameters (θ, φ) rise substantially 
                                                 
16
 If both are positive, they correspond to the “symbiotic pattern” where each population supports 
the other in a mutually beneficial way. But this is, of course, alien to determined adversaries. 
17
 Estimation was also carried out for battle casualties and results are similar to those reported for 
deaths. This is somehow embedded in the data as the figures for DAG wounded in 1948-1949 were 
approximately set by the Government to be three times that of deaths; estimation details are 
available by the author. 
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for both sides, though especially so for DAG.  It is noticeable, however, 
that the relative capability of GNA versus DAG (i.e. the ratio β/δ) falls 
substantially in Phase II from around sevenfold to twofold. This suggests 
that the improvement in fighting acquired by DAG in the second period 
outperformed the improvement of GNA, though still remaining inferior 
in absolute terms. 
In Phase I the state army was employed in containing guerilla forces by 
basically defensive operations18 in the hope that they eventually give up 
by exhaustion. Even when major operations were undertaken by GNA in 
1948 and 1949 guerillas still managed to keep key strongholds and 
continued to cause severe losses in the state army. It is noticeable that 
as a result the battle-death ratio of DAG to GNA remained close to the 
average for most of the time as shown in Fig. 6. 
Fig.6 Ratio of DAG to GNA monthly battle-deaths 
 
 
Source: Data as defined in Appendix C 
                                                 
18
 This looked as the situation described by Clausewitz (1976, p596) as pregnant with disaster. This 
arises when the army is ‘taking things the easy way – using superior force to filch some provinces, 
preferring the security of the minor conquest to a major success’.  
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4.2 Conflict Equilibria  
 
These developments still meant that GNA was impossible to be won by 
DAG, but at the same time they continued to be far from securing a 
quick victory over it, thus leading to a prolonged conflict trap. Guerillas 
were severed by inadequate replenishment, poor training and the 
inoperability of equipment, but they were still mastering low-scale and 
mountainous engagements. Marantzidis (2010, p97) claims that with 
under such adverse factors no army can last for long, but termination 
time may not be short either and conflict can take several turns before 
concluding19. 
To evaluate the conflict trap, two non-zero steady-states are calculated 
for each set of estimated parameters per period as described in 
Appendix A. The higher equilibrium is found to be asymptotically 
unstable in both phases, as the roots’ module exceeds unity. In contrast, 
the lower equilibrium is asymptotically stable in both periods suggesting 
the presence of a conflict trap. Tellingly, the stable equilibrium values 
are found to be close to the historical average of battle deaths occurring 
in each phase, implying that the conflict could have had been 
perpetuated around these levels.  
In the autumn 1948, a new impasse emerged after GNA first cleared 
Grammos but then failed to hold Vitsi. The high toll of casualties and 
massive defections that took place demoralized Greek military 
leadership and produced such serious divisions with the US mission to  
                                                 
19
 That outcomes are not necessarily determined by army numbers was colorfully expressed by a 
Government supporter who was skeptical about “the alleged mathematical assertions … on so many 
more armies than bandits … How then it happens that the former do not snatch the latter from the 
neck, to finish them off?”; Kathimerini 30/1/1049, reprinted in Rizospastis (2011, pp 397-398). 
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the point that its withdrawal was seriously considered; Woodhouse 
(1976, pp 144-145). It was only after the visit of the State and Defense 
Secretaries to Greece in October 1948 that US engagement was 
reaffirmed and the demoralized Government20 got persuaded to plan 
new major offensives against DAG strongholds by appointing a hardliner 
veteran as Field Marshal.  
In the Spring 1949, three developments weakened DAG: First its 
leadership that was favoring partisan warfare was replaced in January 
1949 by a team more eager to engage in large-scale operations, despite 
poor training and equipment. Second, the logistic support that DAG was 
receiving from abroad was sharply diminished after the Soviet Union 
advised KKE leadership21 in April 1949 to end it. Third, DAG became 
more vulnerable after Yugoslavia ceased to provide a safe backyard for 
retreating guerillas and sealed its borders in July 1949.  
Even so, DAG was not succumbing. To resolve the impasse, an out-of-
proportions escalation took place in the summer of 1949,  exceeding all 
previous battles in all scores: human losses peaked for both sides as DAG 
casualties – including those captured or surrendered – reached 71% of 
its total strength and GNA dead tripled relative to the average in the 
previous two years. The air force was intensively involved in the 
operation and bombing reached unprecedented levels. It was due to this 
                                                 
20
 Averof (2010, pp 323-324) claims that high ranking officials in the US were considering to opt out 
Greece, while the Government was seriously contemplating defeat. 
21
 According to his own testimony, the new DAG leader was notified in 20/4/1949 that “Stalin put 
forward the case for retreating, for ending the armed struggle”; quoted in Rizospastis (2011, p 449). 
  25 
specific escalation combined with the logistical collapse of DAG that 
made its forces to be terminally defeated.22 
5. Grievances 
To examine whether and the extent to which the Greek Civil War was 
influenced by socioeconomic factors, a spatial analysis is undertaken at 
the beginning, the middle year and the last year of the conflict.  
Political discontent against the Government was manifested twice in 
1946, initially during the elections in March and later in the Referendum 
for the restoration of the Monarchy in September of that year. In the 
former, the Communist Party advocated abstention from the polls, but 
then it decided to participate in the latter by fervently supporting the 
republican ticket. Using data compiled by Nikolakopoulos (1985), an 
approximate23 measure of political protestation is obtained as the simple 
average of abstention and republican vote as percentages of voting 
population in the 38 prefectures of the country. This measure is then 
regressed against various types of socioeconomic factors and grievances 
as explanatory factors.  
First, the Marxist view is tested. According to KKE, Greek society was in a 
process of rapid proletarianization that was strengthening the struggle 
for the socialist transformation. The class-structure (PROLET) is 
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 The sweeping victory in Grammos was seen by many as vindicating the supremacy of military 
professionals over self-trained communist leaders who ignore fundamental principles of tactical war; 
see, for example, Tsakalotos (1971, p317). Though factually true, the assertion should also include 
huge material superiority as an explanatory factor. 
23
 The republican ticket was supported not only by the communists but also by the various factions of 
Liberals, thus political discontent does not fully correspond to the influence of KKE. However as the 
Government employed all means available to secure the return of the King, opposing the royal ticket 
radicalized several non-communist activists and many of them were subsequently persecuted and 
joined the communist ranks.  
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calculated as the proportion of workers to total active population in 
each prefecture. As suggested by Miguel et al (2004) for estimating 
conflict situations, an instrumental variables approach is employed   by 
considering that proletarianization is accelerated by rising 
unemployment (UNEMP) as an indicator of economic slackness and by 
the degree of capitalist concentration proxied here by the proportion of 
employees per firm (FEMPL) in each prefecture. Results in Table 4 show 
that the Marxist interpretation is neither significant at the 10% level nor 
has any explanatory power for the political discontent in 1946. 
An alternative explanation is offered by three indices of social discontent 
rooted in pre-war grievances, namely the problem of refugees fled to 
Greece after the ill-fated campaign in Asia Minor in 1922, the collapse of 
small and medium size enterprises after the economic crisis in 1932 and 
the perennial rural question that had led to violent uprisings since the 
beginning of the 20th century. The first grievance is measured by the 
proportion of refugees per local population (REFUG), the second by the 
total number of real-estate foreclosures (FORCLS) enforced by the banks 
in 1934-38 and scaled to 100,000 inhabitants and the third by an index 
(RUREVL) of pre-war rural revolts per prefecture as compiled by 
Seferiadis (1999). As shown in Table 4, all these indices are found to be 
statistically significant and correctly signed, confirming the view of Close 
(2003) that much of the post-war political opposition was stemming 
from the fact that the Government was in no mood to correct past-
entrenched grievances.  
After partisan warfare was adopted as the main form of the armed 
struggle, guerillas were gathered in the mountains where DAG 
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headquarters were set up. Data are available for the concentrations in 
11 HQs in January 1948, and for 21 ones between March and August 
1949 and are subsequently used to analyze the spatial characteristics of 
the civil war in terms of morphology and local grievances. Morphology is 
measured by the altitude of mountains (MOUNT) and the distance 
(DISTNB) from the northern border of Greece, through which a safe 
refuge was found for retreating and regrouping. Other morphology 
indices, such as forest density, land cultivation or country roads, are not 
found to be significant in the estimation. 
A measure of political grievances accumulated up to 1948 is the number 
of persecutions by state forces against local populations during 1945-46 
as has been documented in a Report submitted by DAG in the United 
Nations later that year. A measure of the political grievances afterwards 
is the number of citizens prosecuted during 1946-48 in the emergency 
martial courts operating in nearby areas. Details of data definitions and 
compilations to correspond to the areas of DAG HQs are given in 
Appendix C and results are summarized in Table 4. 
Estimation shows that guerilla concentrations in 1948 were stronger in 
high mountains and had a high elasticity with respect to political 
persecutions as around half of them seemed to choose joining DAG in 
order to avoid further purges. It is noticeable that the distance from 
borders is not found significant in 1948, as the strategy of DAG still 
aimed to spread the conflict all over the country. The pattern changed in 
1949 as DAG troops retreated in the northern areas of Greece, thus both 
altitude and distance from border are found to be significant. A strong 
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elasticity with respect to prosecutions is again detected, virtually in the 
same range as the earlier persecutions.  
6. The economic legacy of the Greek Civil War  
Greece was already ruined before the Liberation in 1944 as population 
was decimated by either starvation or mass reprisals, most of the 
infrastructure was destroyed, essential goods were vanished, and 
markets were replaced by barter. Hyperinflation continued to reign in 
until 1946, and the currency was serially collapsing. To complete the 
picture of abject suffering, malaria was ravaging rural populations and 
was partially contained only after a huge humanitarian aid from the UN.  
Yet, there is no sign that ordinary Greek people were keen to engage in 
yet another armed struggle right after one had just been ended. Inspired 
by the reconstruction programs elsewhere in Europe, the common 
expectation – shared by the Government but also by the Communist 
Party24 - was that Greece would be helped by the Allies to rebuild the 
economy, improve the functioning of the state and restore safety and 
calm. In spite of the post-war chaos and open political confrontations, 
the Greek economy started to rebound in 1946 and it was likely to offer 
more rather than fewer opportunities for employment and prosperity; 
for an account of economic developments see Makinen (1984, 1986). 
Thus, the theories of greed reviewed in Section 2 do not seem to explain 
the motives behind the ensued conflict, though they cannot be ruled out 
                                                 
24
 KKE (1964, p524) in an unusual language emphasized the importance of the people “ensuring order 
and calm so as to rebuild the country”. 
  29 
completely25. For Greece the interaction between economic 
deterioration and the spread of civil strife rather than being in the 
direction assumed by Collier and Hoeffler (2001), most probably run 
from the latter to the former as discussed by Sambanis (2004).  
After the conflict got escalated to a full Civil War, the economy was hit 
to a point that was not compensated by the influx of US and other 
international aid. Thousands of people were killed or otherwise 
displaced, transportation and communications were cut, and production 
halted in several areas. Thomadakis (1995) demonstrates that the 
financing of reconstruction was severed by excessive military spending 
and this further fuelled further social discontent and led to failures of 
reconstruction and stabilization policies. While the economies in other 
occupied countries were stabilized immediately after the end of the war 
in 1945 and subsequently rebounded on a speedy growth path, growth 
in Greece remained slack until 1949 widening the gap with the rest of 
Europe. Growth accelerated only after 1950 and GDP reached its 
potential trajectory in 1956, confirming Collier and Hoeffler (2007, p 40) 
that economic activity takes about ten years to recover after a civil war. 
To assess the impact of civil strife on GDP two alternative approaches 
are adopted: 
I.Separating WW2 and Civil War effects:  
Between 1940 and 1949 Greece suffered both from World War II (WW2) 
and the Civil War. To delineate the effects of the latter on Greek GDP, 
                                                 
25
 Such motives may be generated when the adversaries adopt exclusion tactics for the other side.  In 
fact, exclusion politics were imposed in Greece at a massive scale during the dictatorship 1936-40, 
only to be brutally exceeded by the following occupation. The establishment wanted this exclusion to 
continue in the post-war period, while KKE was advocating a socialist revolution that would eliminate 
the capitalist sector.  
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two groups of Western European countries are considered as control 
variables26: The group of countries that remained neutral (Sweden, 
Portugal, Ireland and Switzerland) and the group of occupied countries 
other than Greece (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland). Comparing the second with the first, an assessment of the 
effects of WW2 is obtained which is found to depend on the human toll 
that befell each country. The estimate is then projected on Greece to 
give potential GDP in the absence of the civil war. Data are taken from 
Maddison historical series expressed in 1990 US dollars and indexed at 
1930 as shown in Fig. 7a.  Estimation runs for 1930-1956 so as to allow 
for a ten year span27 before and after WW2; details are given in 
Appendix C.    
Fig. 7a GDP index 1930=100                             Fig. 7b Actual and potential GDP 
for Greece 1940-1956. 
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 Spain is excluded from the neutral group because it was affected by its own civil war in the 1930s 
and UK from the second group because it was not occupied. Countries of Eastern Europe are not 
considered as followed a different economic system after 1945. 
27
 Besides equal time spans, the choice of 1930 means that all countries in both groups were sharing a 
common institutional economic framework within the Gold Exchange system, at least for some years. 
Also until 1958 when the European Economic Community was founded, there was no major 
institutional differentiation among them. 
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The difference between potential and actual GDP  is 
taken as a proxy for the civil war effect as shown in Fig. 7b, and 
cumulative losses are finally obtained over the period 1945-1956 
according to the discounting formula: 
      (4) 
Using a 5% discount rate per annum, cumulative losses are found to 
represent 95% of GDP in 1956. To check robustness of the estimate an 
alternative approach based on measuring the destruction of production 
factors is also applied. 
II.Growth accounting:  
Assuming a production function with constant returns to scale, output in 
constant prices (Y) is given by: 
       (5) 
where A, N, k, Z and L denote technology, number of factories, capital 
stock per factory, rural livestock and total wage labor respectively.  
Parameters (η, ε) denote the non-agricultural and agricultural capital 
stock elasticities of output respectively, and are proxied by the relative 
shares of capital income in total production. If these factors of 
production  are destroyed by ΔN, ΔZ and ΔL respectively while 
technology and capital size per unit of production remains unaffected, 
output growth drops according to the accounting equation by: 
     (6) 
  32 
The loss in employment attributed to the occurrence of Civil War is 
accounted for by the reduction of active population due to deaths and 
severe battle-casualties, displacements of rural populations during the 
conflict, long-term internment of political opponents and expatriations 
that took place after the war ended as defeated guerillas and their 
families fled Greece for decades to come. As displayed in Table 4 
aggregate losses represented 10.22% of active labour force in 1951, the 
nearest Census available for the civil war years.  
The destruction of industrial capital and that of the livestock are 
evaluated in Appendix B and shown in Table 4, and then an average 
output loss of -12.25% per annum is finally calculated. Discounted at 5% 
annually over a ten year period this leads to a total loss of 99.37% of the 
GDP in 1956, not much above the figure obtained by the first approach. 
Both estimates fall within the range of [90 110%] calculated by Collier 
and Hoeffler (2007) as the confidence interval for GDP losses due to a 
relatively long civil war. Given the huge cost inflicted on the country, the 
question is why the confrontation went out of control for so many years 
and this is discussed below. 
7. The prolongation of conflict as a strategic and institutional 
failure 
In Section 3, the prolongation of conflict was accounted for by the 
military capabilities of the opponents but this can hardly justify the 
failure of reaching an early compromise. It is ex post clear that a 
negotiated end between the two sides could have had been to their 
mutual advantage, thus the failure to do so must be explained by the 
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inability of adversaries to comprehend the situation and its dire 
consequences. Though it is difficult to imagine any of the conflict-
perpetuating failures described in Section 2 that has not been 
committed by the adversaries in the GCW, it is perhaps useful to 
examine the mechanisms through which such dramatic errors did 
actually take place. 
7.1. The broken trust 
The domestic rivals repeatedly searched for some sort of compromise, at 
least until the end 0f 1948, but failed all the way through partly because 
their own priors about the other’s sincerity and partly because of the 
pressure for more aggressiveness exercised by the rank and file of each 
side. Both reasons were deeply rooted in the way that the Varkiza 
Agreement on disarmament in 1945 was implemented in practice. 
Instead of an opportunity for reconciliation and integration, the Left felt 
it as a humiliation after its supporters were surrendered and 
subsequently persecuted, while the Right saw it as mission 
unaccomplished in its resolve to annihilate rivals and dominate post-war 
politics. Sfikas (2001) argues that KKE kept putting some extra conditions 
on its peace proposals as hedging against being cheated for a second 
time, and invariably this was giving the Government hardliners the 
pretext to reject the offer as unacceptable.  
Another characteristic episode with pretentious conditions took place 
when KKE made an appeal for ceasefire in May 1948 by denouncing 
seizing power by force and the Government expressed some interest but 
demanded28 that all children transferred by DAG to the People’s 
                                                 
28
 For details see Averof (2010, p292). 
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Republics in Eastern Europe fore with return forewith to Greece as “… an 
unfailing test for the sincerity of the proposals”. The ultimatum was 
rejected by DAG and a major GNA offensive followed in a few weeks 
time, thus re-escalating the conflict. 
Uncontrollable violence was also propagated by rank and file as both 
armies included rural outlaws that had long practiced looting in the 
villages. After WW2 several of local militias joined either GNA or DAG in 
order to gain legitimacy and have more seizure opportunities29. DAG for 
its part had issued many warnings against looting rural populations, 
while the Government had to send troops against local rightwing barons; 
for an account see Gregoriadis (2011, p127). But as Civil War was 
spreading, alertness by each side on its own banditry was quickly 
subordinated to the aggressiveness against the other. 
7.2. Signaling by proxy 
In order to overcome the signaling breakdown, both sides attempted to 
invest credibility on their proposals by submitting them to the other’s 
patrons. Thus the Government approached the Soviet Union asking it to 
convince KKE to abandon the armed struggle, while the Left developed 
regular contacts with the British who in 1947 endorsed several of their 
ideas for reconciliation; see Sfikas (2002, p85). But as the geopolitical 
landscape was entering the Cold War phase, such improvisations were 
quickly superseded by events for the following reasons.  
On the one hand, USSR was unwilling to get involved in arbitrating the 
Greek conflict and was rather trying to get completely disentangled and 
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 A massive assimilation of this type was also happening in China’s civil war at that time and Mao was 
fearing that bandits gave the Red Army a ‘mentality of roving insurgents’; see Hobsbawm (2000, p 
116).  
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concentrate on its own security concerns in Eastern Europe. On the 
other, the attitudes of US and UK had also been reversed after the Cold 
War was declared. During the battle of Athens in 1945, it was the the 
British who were adamant about crushing the Left while the Americans30 
were openly supporting its participation to the Government as the only 
guarantee against the dominance of the Right.  Even when the Truman 
Doctrine was proclaimed a sizable majority of Americans felt that it was 
wrong to bypass the UN (Mazower (2012, p227), and US officials were 
still suggesting that a ‘real amnesty’ should be granted as a precondition 
for the economic reconstruction (Porter 2006, p229).  
But as soon as US replaced the British in the role of the mighty guardian 
of Greece, both switched views on how the impasse should be resolved. 
In 1948, the British Government produced a plan for ending hostilities 
that incorporated several of the preconditions set by communists, and it 
was now the turn of Americans to reject it and opt for a clear victory 
over DAG. Besides, the British had been sidelined in the geopolitics of 
the Cold War and their delayed eagerness to reconcile Greece was not 
heard by those in the frontline. 
7.3. KKE: A cause without a strategy 
The reason why external conditions and foreign considerations were of 
so crucial importance was of course that the domestic rivals lacked a 
coherent strategy of their own. To start with, KKE was confused on any 
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 Before the Cold War started, Americans were highly critical of the inefficiency and unfairness of the 
socio-economic conditions in Greece. For example, Porter (2006, p225) was openly dismissive of the 
“banking clique … determined – above everything else – to protect its financial privileges whatever 
the cost on the economic health of the country”. The remark strongly echoes the communist claims 
that ‘… (financial) scandals and embezzlements increase plutocratic profits and reveal the rottenness 
and decomposition of the ruling classes’; see KKE (1964, p568). 
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major issue: For example, the final objective of the armed struggle was 
never made clear. Initially, the aim was a ‘democratic integration’, but 
later shifted to swiftly reaching the stage of a ‘socialist transformation’, 
thus stripping any remaining political support from non-communist 
sympathizers. The confusion was further multiplied by the question on 
whether the party was consciously engaged in the civil war or just driven 
by the events. Even years after the conflict, top cadres continued to 
claim that such a decision was never taken while others insisted that it 
was confidentially planned31. Confusion was openly manifested when 
KKE abstained from parliamentary elections in March 1946 to avoid 
legitimizing an allegedly rigged poll, but a few months later it took part 
in the restoration referendum that was indeed conducted with open 
violence against republicans32.  
Moreover, KKE remained throughout indecisive on whether to pursue a 
full urban confrontation as advocated by its leader or instead engage in 
partisan action as favored by the DAG chief. Such a basic disagreement 
was a critical violation of war principles33 and soon led to adventurist 
tactics and pointless bloodshed in order to conceal it. Eventually, the gap 
between the two views led to the dismissal of DAG’ chief in January 
1949 but rather than making the leadership more realistic this widened 
the illusions about surviving the conflict. As successor’s main credential 
was party loyalty, DAG uncritically endorsed the all-out confrontation 
with GNA that led to its demise a few months later. A crucial 
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 Napoleon (1993, p89) had warned that ‘in civil wars it is not everybody’s to know what course to 
follow and something more than military prudence is required’.  
32
 Even staunch supporters of the King admitted that the process was far from transparent; see, for 
example, Averof (2010, p). 
33
 Clausewitz (1976, p579) had strongly advised that ‘no one starts a war – or rather, no one in his 
senses should do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and 
how he intends to conduct it’. 
  37 
consequence of dispersed action was that it made the lack of 
professional leadership to look less critical on the battle-field. As most of 
the DAG chiefs were self-trained Resistance fighters rather than career 
officers, this meant that leadership never felt obliged to operationally 
evaluate the situation and allowed party hardliners to insist for the 
continuation of the conflict34.  
Another deficiency, and quite critical as it turned to be, was the 
opportunistic stance of KKE on the ‘national issue’ of Greek Macedonia. 
In the aftermath of WW2, KKE had initially adopted an uncompromising 
position by pledging that the rights and equality of Slav-speaking 
population should be implemented within the territory of Greece, the 
borders of which “… are sacrosanct and inviolable35”. But as civil war 
intensified, DAG was critically depended on logistical support by 
Yugoslavia and in the beginning of 1949 KKE declared36 that Slav-
Macedonians would be granted full “national emancipation”. Instead of 
attracting more Slav-speaking fighters to its ranks, DAG suffered dearly 
as the Government immediately seized the opportunity and accused it 
for treason, while Yugoslavia remained unimpressed and finally closed 
the borders a few months later.  It was only after its defeat37 that KKE 
denounced “the partition plans by Tito against Greek Macedonia” and 
admitted that its own volte face constituted a ‘serious error’. 
                                                 
34
 Perhaps the most notorious rejection of reality was the claim by the KKE leader two months after 
the final defeat in Grammos that “the main forces of DAG remain unscathed with arms by the side”! 
35
 Second Plenary, February 1946; reprinted in KKE (1964, p 549). 
36
 Fifth Plenary, January 1949; reprinted in KKE (1964, p 577). 
37
 Sixth Plenary, October 1949; reprinted in KKE (1964, p 583). 
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7.4. The Government: Power without inclusion 
The Government strategy was also severed by the lack of a robust 
leadership. Factionalism was the rule of the day and ten postwar 
Governments had been formed by the end of 1947; i.e. with less than 
three months duration in average. This made the search for a 
comprehensive strategy to look vain and the hope was that the political 
system will become more coherent only under the aegis of the King. 
Having spent most of his adult years either supporting the pre-war 
dictatorship or abroad and hardly speaking the language38, the King 
showed no interest in inspiring national reconciliation or just improving 
the life of Greek citizens; see Porter (2006, p83) and Gregoriadis (1973, 
pp192-194). His low-key successor seemed to be more consensual but 
was quickly overpowered by his hardliner spouse39 and any notion of 
compromise evaporated quickly. 
The incompetence of the Government was omnipresent40 and ministers’ 
sole concern seemed to be how to keep in office. In fact, the chaotic 
situation made them more likely to stay because usually uncertainty 
blurs personal accounting, and this led to remain unaccounted for 
neglecting reconstruction and thus perpetuating the grievances of the 
population. Thus small parties did not have a real interest in 
reconciliation, since the participation of the Left in the Government 
would have meant the ending of theirs.  
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 According to a GNA propagandist, the King was unable to properly deliver his first radio Address to 
the Nation in 29/9/1946 despite intensive rehearsals; see Sifnaios (1950, p145). 
39
 The Government was frequently embarrassed by Queen Frederika’s attitudes of replacing the King 
in visiting the war front or brandishing guerillas as “common thieves”; see Kalyvas (2006, p 63). 
40
 Porter (2006, p80 and 162). 
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Overwhelmed by clientilistic concerns, the Government was increasingly 
in favor of excluding by force its opponents from participating in power 
sharing or distributional institutions. In the absence of a genuine 
democratic process to involve and express the new social balances that 
emerged after WW2, the political and institutional segregation ignited 
tensions and allowed the extremes of both the Right and the Left to 
capitalize on the prospect of an all-out confrontation and the winner to 
take them all as discussed in Skarpedas (2008).  
A similar pledge by KKE was resonating in several of the excluded, 
though today, after the collapse of centrally planned economies in 
Eastern Europe, it is perhaps difficult to imagine that the hope of rising 
prosperity was invested in the expectation of socialism.  But, as 
Fukuyama (2012) notes, during the first half of the twentieth century 
there was a strong consensus that some form of socialism was 
unavoidable for all advanced countries. In Greece in particular, the cause 
was even more credible than elsewhere as the Left had seized during 
WW2 both the patriotic agenda by massively resisting occupation and 
the distribution agenda by organizing food supplies to the starving 
population. 
8. Conclusions 
In other cases of history, the costs and perils of a civil conflict accelerate 
the introduction and empowerment of institutions that promote social 
equity and participation in public life. For example, in the aftermath of 
the US Civil War the victors immediately started the Reconstruction 
phase in the Confederacy states by advancing political emancipation of 
  40 
the slaves, though the plan was partially thwarted later. In Belgium the 
risk of civil conflict was highly probable in the aftermath of WW2 but 
finally an agreement between the rival sides helped to diffuse tensions; 
for an account see Conway (2012). Similarly in Italy civil war was avoided 
after the Communist Party denounced the arms struggle and accepted 
the Constitution41 despite the pressure exercised by hardliners to start 
the conflict. 
In contrast, the politics of exclusion that ruled before and after the Civil 
War in Greece rather than being replaced by inclusion institutions 
became the norm. Not only those in the guerilla camps were severely 
punished or denied the right to return to Greece, but a great number of 
actual or hypothesized sympathizers continued to be persecuted for 
years to come. The paper showed that Greece was entrapped in a 
prolonged conflict that resulted in major losses and prevented Greece to 
follow the rapid economic growth in the post-war years.  
But this was not the end of the dire consequences. As a meticulous 
system of policing enforced the exclusion of political rivals from public 
posts and several economic activities, emigration was their only option 
and this resulted to further losses being accumulated long after 
hostilities ended. The country had yet to undergo a seven year 
dictatorship before political segregation finally ended in 1974 and a 
reconciliation process was gradually set in. As social violence and 
political extremism re-emerge in today’s Greece as a consequence of the 
                                                 
41
 Applebaum (2012, p 49) describes that Togliati, the Communist Party Secretary, was selected by 
Communist International in Moscow to play a key role in postwar government in Italy. However, 
Togliati consistently stood against the armed struggle, even when the Left was denied participation in 
the government in 1947. According to Rizas (2001), he was reprimanded by Kominform in Moscow as 
his policies were considered to be defensive and passive.  
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deep economic crisis, some lessons of history may be worth recalling. 
The present study showed that if one starts with deeply divisive politics, 
it is likely to see the confrontation to escalate into a self-perpetuated 
conflict.  
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Appendix A:  A mathematical model of conflict 
Possible equilibria have to satisfy  and are obtained – as 
shown in Fig. 8a -  at the intersection of the functions:  
        (7a) 
        (7b) 
 
Fig. 8a Positive conflict equilibria. Fig. 8b Parameters in the 
pointed areas result in 
positive equilibria 
The system leads to a second-order equation and the existence and type 
of equilibria are determined by the sign of the discriminant:  
      (8) 
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Two positive equilibria require that D>0, and is straightforward to show 
that this is ensured with the self-protection parameters satisfying one of 
the following conditions: 
    (9) 
A unique positive equilibrium exists if one of the conditions holds as 
equality, and no equilibrium is found if both are violated. Permissible 
areas for the existence of equilibrium are shown in Fig.8b. The 
characteristics roots that drive the dynamics of the system are found as 
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the various steady-
states (R*, S*) as follows: 
  
 (10) 
with expression (Ω) defined as: 
        (11) 
Convergence to equilibrium requires that the module of the eigenvalues 
is below unity42, while complex roots imply limit cycles. Since 
expressions are nonlinear, results are only obtained numerically. For 
given disturbances and parameter values, the system may exhibit a 
variety of dynamics for non-trivial equilibrium levels. 
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 The characteristic equation takes the form z
2
-bz+c=0, where (b) is calculated as the trace and (c) as 
the determinant of the Jacobian. A necessary and sufficient condition for two stable roots is 
|b|<1+c<2, no matter if roots are real or complex. 
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In contrast, autonomous lagged systems preclude the existence of stable 
non-trivial steady-states and are thus unsuitable to describe prolonged 
conflicts, unless a more complicated non-linear structure is assumed43. 
To see why, consider the system: 
       (12a) 
      (12b) 
Four steady-states are obtained at (0,0), (0,α/β), (γ/δ,0), (γ/δ, α/β) and 
the following Jacobian matrices are formed respectively: 
  (13) 
Characteristic roots are easily obtained as the four pairs 
(  and  Stability holds only 
for the zero equilibrium if α,γ>0,  the second and third are 
indeterminate, while the non-trivial equilibrium is always unstable. An 
non-trivial unstable limit cycle occurs only if αγ<0, i.e. when one of the 
self-protection parameters turns negative, thus awkwardly assuming 
that the army becomes self-destructive.44 
Similar problems arise even in continuous-time modeling that takes the 
form:  
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 For example, Din (2013) considers a non-linear autonomous discrete-time model in fractional form 
and shows that the non-trivial equilibrium is asymptotically stable only if several conditions are 
imposed upon the parameters. 
44
 Past casualties lead to more losses in the future if the army is either constantly depleted from 
critical support units or is panic stricken after a major defeat but none of them is compatible with a 
prolonged conflict. Losses can also be self-multiplied in suicidal insurgencies where a new wave of 
martyrs follows those previously perished but, again, this cannot last for long. 
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       (14a) 
       (14b) 
The non-zero equilibrium and the Jacobian are the same as in (13). 
Eigenvalues are given by , thus if αγ>0 the system is unstable, 
while for αγ<0 it becomes indeterminate with a limit cycle. For the non-
zero steady-state to be meaningful, this requires βδ<0, again implying 
improbable opposite behaviors for the two fighting sides.  
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Appendix B:  An estimate of GDP losses due to the civil war 
Estimating the war effect: The effect of WW2 on the economic activity of 
occupied countries other than Greece is estimated by the following 
equation: 
  
  (15) 
   
   
OLS, 1931-1956, R2bar=0.33, DW=1.92, F-stat=26.49(p=0.0)  
In the above expression YOCC is GDP in 1990 US Dollars of occupied 
countries, namely France, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland, while YNEUT is the average of the neutral group (Sweden, 
Portugal, Ireland and Switzerland). Two time dummies are introduced to 
account for the span of WW2 (i.e. WAR=1 for 1940-44), and another for 
the reconstruction period, i.e. REC=1 for 1945-46. Both are scaled by the 
human loss (WTOL) expressed as percent of total population per 
occupied country. Potential GDP  for Greece for each period 
1940-1956 is calculated from the above equation by substituting the 
Greek war toll:  
(16) 
The cumulative output loss is then evaluated by (4) and found to be 95% 
of GDP in 1956. 
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A production function approach: The destruction of livestock was 
evaluated as 9.91% of the level in 1940 as no livestock Census was 
repeated in 1951. This probably underestimates the loss as a proportion 
of current level as livestock was severed during the occupation due to 
hunger and plunder. 
Assuming that factories vary at par with the growth of industrial output 
(Q) and employment (i.e. ΔN/N=ΔL/L=ΔQ/Q=q), then by using prewar 
industrial data the loss of capital due to civil war is given by: 
    (17) 
where subscripts PW and CW denote prewar and civil war periods 
respectively and  is the annual growth rate of industrial output 
during 1934-38 obtained from economic statistics in ESYE (1939). As 
industrial output had reached in 1949 90% of its prewar level45 one, by 
assuming away technology changes, can set  and use 
data from Table 4 to obtain a reduction of physical capital equal to -
15.76% of its stock. The destruction of livestock was evaluated as 9.91% 
of the level in 1940 as no livestock Census was repeated in 1951. Both 
figures probably underestimate the loss as a proportion of current level 
stocks, since they were severed during the occupation due to hunger, 
plunder and reprisals. 
The share of non-agricultural capital income is obtained from 
Christodoulakis et al (1996, p212) as η=0.382 in average over 1954-1960 
                                                 
45
 As described by Stathakis (2002, p 66). 
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which is the nearest period with disaggregated data available. A similar 
calculation for the rural stock by taking into account that in agriculture 
90% were self-employed or employers gives ε=0.253, and substituting 
into (6) the total output growth rate is found to drop by -12.15% 
annually. 
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Appendix C: Data and sources 
Nomenclature 
Nomenclature of the Greek Civil War was never agreeable as each side 
was offensively labeling its opponents. For the Government the army 
was the Greek National Army (GNA) while its rivals were ‘bandits’, 
‘robber-bandits’ or even  ‘Slav-gangs’. The communists had proclaimed 
the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) and brandished Government as 
‘imperialist lackeys’ and its forces as ‘monarchist-fascist troops’, as well 
as ‘robber-bandits’ by reciprocation. The war itself was accordingly 
called ‘contra-bandit’ or ‘liberation struggle’ and was mutually described 
as a ‘civil’ one only in the 1980s. The present paper adopts a terminology 
as close as possible to each side’s preferences for its own troops. Thus 
GNA stands for Government troops, army soldiers and state forces, 
while guerillas, fighters and rebel forces (‘andartes’) are interchanged in 
describing DAG. 
Main data sources 
DAG, 1947, Report to the UN, published under the title “That’s how Civil 
War started”, Glaros editions, Athens. 
ESYE, 1939, Annuaire Statistique de la Grèce 1939, Athens. 
ESYE, 1946, Population de la Grèce 1940, Athens. 
ESYE, 1955, Population de la Grèce 1951, Athens. 
GES, 1970, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerilla Struggle 1946-49: The 
cleansing of Roumeli and the first battle of Grammos, Athens, (in Greek). 
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GES, 1971, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerilla Struggle 1946-49: The 
first year of the anti-guerilla struggle 1946, Athens, (in Greek). 
GES, 1976, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerilla Struggle 1946-49: 
Operations of the Third Army Corps 1947-1949, Athens, (in Greek). 
GES, 1980, The Greek Army in the Anti-guerilla Struggle 1946-49: The 
second year of the anti-guerilla struggle 1947, Athens, (in Greek). 
JUSMAPG, History, 1948-1950, National Archives, US. 
Michiotis N., 2007, In the name of the King: Emergency martial courts in 
Greece 1946-1960, Synchroni Epochi editions, Athens, (in Greek). 
Nikolakopoulos E., 1985, Parties and parliamentary elections in Greece 
1946-1964: Electoral geography of political forces, EKKE editions, Athens, 
(in Greek). 
Compiling battle data 
State army (GNA) figures include the Army, Gendarmerie and armed 
nationalist groups.  Rebel figures (DAG) include the fighters and civilians 
involved in skirmishes. Figures for 1946, are from GES (1971) as follows: 
January-June 1946, monthly aggregates of all battles and skirmishes, 
classified by the author.  
Figures for July-December 1946, from Tables pp 54, 87, 93, 99, 110, 158 
and 165.  Data from GES (1980) are  given per military operation with 
the following adjustemnts: aggregate data for January and February 
1947 are split equally;  Operation Korax (pp 173, 179) split into May and 
June figures; operation Lelaps (p257) into August and September.  
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Figures for surrendered rebels in 1946 are from GES (1971, Table VII, p 
235). For 1947, from GES (1980) for the areas under the A and B Army 
Corps and GES (1976) for the areas under the C Army Corps. For 1947, 
data are from GES (1980), Diagrams 4 & 5, pp 386-387. For 1948-49 : 
JUSMAPG History, 1949.  
Variables from archives  
ABS46: Abstention rate in the general elections of 31 March 1946. 
Calculated as the difference between participation rates in 1946 and 
1936, and that in 1951. Source: Nikolakopoulos (1985) and personal 
communication. 
DAG : Number of guerrilla fighters with the Democratic Army of Greece, 
monthly  
DHQ_area: Number of DAG fighters grouped per headquarters and 
mountain formations. Data for January 1948, January to July 1949, 
September and December 1949. Source: JUSMAPG, History, 1948-1949, 
maps. 
DISPL : Total number of evacuees from villages in Northern Greece. 
Source: Laiou (1987), Table II, 2. Number of Displaced Persons in 
Northern Greece, by prefecture. 
GNA: Number of personnel in the Greek National Army, monthly figures. 
PROSEC: Number of leftwing citizens prosecuted in the emergency 
martial courts during 1946-51. Initially martial courts were established in 
eleven cities, but as civil war was intensifying they were extended to 
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thirty areas. Allocation is similar to that used for persecutions in 1945-
46. Source: Michiotis (2007, Tables 1 & 2, pp 235-236).  
PURGE: Number of persons persecuted and victimized during 1945-46 as 
described in DAG (1947). Data cover seven areas close to guerilla HQs in 
Central and Northern Greece as explained in Rodakis and Grammenos 
(1987, pp 383-390). To correspond to more disaggregated guerilla 
formations the seven regions are artificially split as shown in Table 5. 
Source: Rizospastis (2011, pp 138-140). 
RCAP: Rebel fighters captured, monthly. 
REP46: Anti-royal vote in the Referendum of 1 September 1946. 
Calculated as the percent rate of republican and blank tickets in total 
votes. Source: Nikolakopoulos (1985) and personal communication. 
RKLD: Battle deaths of DAG, monthly. 
RSUR: Rebel fighters surrendered to GNA, monthly. 
RWND: Wounded of DAG, monthly. 
SKLD: Battle deaths of GNA, monthly. 
SMIA: GNA soldiers missing in action, monthly. 
SWND: Wounded of GNA, monthly. 
Other variables 
DISTNB: Distance of DAG HQs from the northern borders in km; 
calculated by the author. 
  53 
FORCLS: Foreclosures of real estate property per 100,000 habitants in 
each prefecture, annual average 1934-1938; population as in 1940 
Census. Grouped from original data per Tribunal Court (‘Protodikeion’). 
Data for Kilkis and Thesprotia not available. Source: ESYE (1939, Table 
16, p306-307), Annuaire Statistique de la Grèce 1939, Athens. 
GDP: GDP annual data in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
dollars. Source: Angus Maddison Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy 
MOUNT: Altitude of mountains.  
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mountains_in_Greece 
PROLET: Proportion of workers in total active population. Source: ESYE 
(1958), Table 1, pp 11-43. 
REFUG: Refugees as percent of prefecture’s population. Source: ESYE 
(1923), Tables II and III, pp 10-15. The census was conducted in 33 
prefectures and data were adjusted by provinces to conform with the 
division into 38 prefectures.  
RUREVL: Index of prewar rural militancy. Source: Seferiadis (1999) where 
events are described in chronological order. The index was set from 1 for 
rallies to 8 for rebellions. Data represent cumulative rural grievance in 
each  prefecture over the period 1904-1936. 
UNEMP: Rate of unemployment. Unemployed persons as percent of 
total active population. Source: ESYE (1958), Table 1, pp 11-43. 
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WTOL: Human losses in WW2 as percent of population as calculated by 
Frumkin G., 1951, Population Changes in Europe Since 1939, Geneva. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties. 
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Appendix D:  Tables 
 
Table 1. Key statistics of total battle-deaths and casualties 
 
 
Total battle deaths Total casualties 
Unit root test 
46:07-49:08 
-1.466 (p=0.53) -1.027 (p=0.733) 
Jarque_Bera 2.72 (p=0.255) 2.98 (p=0.225) 
Correllation 
(j=0) 
0.828 0.801 
Lag (j= -1) 0.435 0.533 
Lag (j= -2)   
Breaking points of detrended series 
47:12 F=0.31 LLR= 0.278 0.0722;0.0530 
48:01 0.126; 0.099 0.0072; 0.0041 
48:02 0.0775; 0.0574 0.0076; 0.0043 
48:03 0.0187;  0.0117 0.0019; 0.0009 
  
Statistics 
Phase I 
47:07-47:12 
Phase II 
48:01-49:08 
Phase I 
47:07-47:12 
Phase II 
48:01-49:08 
Mean 454 1714 1165 9023 
Std dev 340 629 848 3150 
Volatility % 75% 37% 73% 35% 
Pareto c.c.d.f. λ=0.396 λ=1.55 λ=0.62 λ=1.60 
 
Note: (F) denotes the F-statistic and LR the likelihood ratio 
Source: Data as defined in Appendix C.
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Table 2. Monthly estimates of battle-deaths dynamics. 
 
Dependent variable   
Independent variable   
Phase I 
46:07- 47:12  
Phase II 
48:01- 49:09  
 
Rebels’ battle 
deaths 
State’s battle 
deaths 
Rebels’ 
battle deaths 
State’s 
battle deaths 
constant 
0.145* 
(1.79) 
0.0672*** 
(3.40) 
1.088*** 
(3.95) 
0.237*** 
(4.02) 
-α 
Rebels’ deaths(t-1),  
-1.068** 
(2.56) 
 
-1.156*** 
(6.00) 
 
β 
State’s deaths(t) 
7.17* 
(1.84) 
 
1.267*** 
(3.34) 
 
-γ 
State’s deaths(t-1) 
 
-1.128*** 
(4.44) 
 
-1.697*** 
(7.20) 
δ 
Rebels’ deaths(t) 
 
0.940** 
(2.54) 
 
0.664*** 
(4.59) 
nobs 18 18 21 21 
R
2
 adj 0.257 0.518 0.645 0.715 
DW 1.677 1.713 1.615 1.563 
F-stat (prob) 3.94(0.042) 10.15(0.002) 19.3(0.00) 26.1(0.00) 
High equilibrium 
Characteristic roots 
0.628 0.125 1.651 0.395 
-1.18 and 5.78 -0.52 and 2.13 
Low equilibrium 
Characteristic roots 
0.227 0.074 1.451 0.324 
0.08 and 0.42 -0.02  and 0.88 
Historical average 0.309 0.084 1.364 0.370 
 
Note: Variables in ’000s. t-satistics in brackets. One, two or three stars indicate significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. For the F-statistics probabilities are in brackets. 
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Table 3. Grievances, political discontent and guerilla formations 
 
Dependent variable   
Independent variable   
Republican vote & Abstention 1946 
Rebels’ spatial 
concentration 
 
Marxist 
grievance 
Urban 
grievance 
Urban  
& rural 
1948:01 1949:03-07 
constant 
17.989 
(2.33)** 
15.4076 
(4.22)*** 
6.3242 
(1.15) 
-5839.79 
(3.13)** 
-1288.33 
(1.87)* 
Proletarianization 
a
 
(workers per active 
population) 
0.444 
(1.59)  
   
Refugees 
% population  
0.5072 
(2.64)** 
0.8552 
(2.88)*** 
  
Foreclosures  
per 100,000 
 
0.5158 
(3.31)*** 
0.6166 
(3.31)*** 
  
Agrarian revolts
b
 
per 100,000 
  
0.6851 
(1.78)* 
  
Early persecutions  
1945-46 
   
0.497 
(2.90)** 
 
Court-martialed 
7/1946-12/1948 
    
0.4289 
(2.11)** 
Mountain Altitude (m)    
3.090 
(3.07)** 
1.128 
(2.88)*** 
Distance from border 
(km) 
   - 
-2.409 
(3.41)*** 
Method 2-Stage LS OLS OLS OLS 
OLS, period 
effects 
Nobs 38 36 25 11x1 21x5 
R
2
 adj 0.002  0.34 0.41 0.799 0.246 
DW 0.90 1.28 2.00 0.00 0.137 
F-stat (prob) 2.53(0.12) 9.28(0.0004) 6.49(0.003) 20.97(0.0006) 5.18(0.00) 
 
Notes: (a) Instrumental variables include the rate of unemployment and the degree of business 
concentration proxied by the ratio of employees to employers. (b) The prefecture of Messenia is 
excluded as an outlier because the index of agrarian protest is unusually high, but political 
discontent too low - probably due to openly rigged elections. Data as defined in Appendix C. 
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Table 4.  Human toll and GDP losses due to the Civil War 
 
 Category Losses 
Human capital 
i Active population 1951 2,800,413 
ii Total battle  deaths  43,452 
iii Seriously wounded (x2) 86,904 
iv Ex-patriated by KKE
 
55,881 
v 
Sentenced by Martial Courts 1946-51 
to death or more than 10 years  
48,489 
vi 
Displaced, annual avg 1947-49 
Weighted to the 10-year period 3/10 
279,740 
83,922 
 
Total losses in human capital (ii to vi) 
As percent of active population  
[As in (i) adjusted by the losses] 
318,648 
10.22% 
Industry 
vii Factories destroyed  241 
 As % of estimated capital stock 15.76% 
Livestock 
ix Livestock in 1940 14,945,396 
 
Destruction  during 1946-49 
As perecent of 1940 livestock 
1,480,669 
9.91% 
Growth accounting  
 Estimated annual GDP loss 12.25% 
 Retardation period 1946-55, years 10 
 Total GDP loss discounted at 5% 99.37% 
 
Note: Details of the calculation are given in Appendix B.  
Data as follows: 
i. ESYE (1951, Table 1, pp2-9). 
iii. Seriously wounded estimated as twice the number of deaths.. 
iv.Papathanasiou (2002, p 147). Of those 17,352 were children, but accounted here as active 
population as most of them  reached working age within a few years. 
v.Michiotis (2007, p 235-239). 
vi.Laiou (1987, p 71-72). Maximum number displaced in each year. 
vii and x.As quoted in Rizospastis (2011, p 564), initial source unknown. 
ix.ESYE (1939, Table B1, pp 123-124). 
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Table 5.  DAG formations and regional allocation of persecutions 
 
 
Formation 
Including nearby 
formations in 
Distance 
from 
borders 
(km) 
Regional 
shares of 
purges 
1945-46 
Allocation of 
martial courts 
prosecutions 
1 
Peloponnese  400  
Patras, Tripoli, 
Corinth,Calamata 
2 Evia  350 23% of FFE Thiva 
3 
Parnassos 
Vardousia 
Panetolikon 
300 50% of FFE 
Athens, Lamia/2, 
Mesologi/2 
4 Othrys Magnesia 250 27% of FFE Lamia/2, Volos 
5 Agrafa Tzoumerka 
Xinias, Souli 
200 Trikala, 
Karditsa, Arta 
 
Trikala 
6 Pindos Smolikas, Orliakas 
Zagoria, Mourgana 
50 Ioannina/2 Ioannina/2 
7 Hasia Antihasia,Koziakas, 
Kamvounia 
150 50% of 
Larissa+Pieria 
Larissa/2 
8 Olympos Pieria, Ossa 150 50% of 
Larissa+Pieria 
Larissa/2 
9 Vermion Siniatsiko,Vourinos 100 50% of KGIP Kozani/2 
10 Grammos  1 Ioannina/2 
Kastoria/2 
Ioannina/2 
Kastoria/2 11 Vitsi  30 Kastoria/2, 
Florina 
Kastoria/2 
Florina 12 Kaimktsalan Paikon 50 50% of KGIP Kozani/2,Veria 
13 Belles Korona, Krousia 1  Kilkis 
14 Halkidiki Kerdylia,Pangaion 100  Thessaloniki/2 
15 Serres Orvilos 1  Serres, 
Thessaloniki/2 16 Haidu Boz-Dag 1  Drama 
17 Thrace Vyrsini, Sapka 50  Xanthi, 
Alexandropolis 18 Lesvos  300  Mytilini/2 
19 Hania Lefka Ori 800  Hania 
20 Cephalonia Enos 400  Mesologi/2 
21 Samos Icaria 500  Mytilini/2 
 
Notes: FFE is the area of Fthiotis, Fokis and Evia. Weights are proportions of regional 
populations to the total population of Sterea (excluding Attica), according to the Census 
1951.  
KGIP refers to the total of Kozani, Grevena, Imathia and Pella. 
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